Farewell national champions by Nicolas Véron
SUMMARYControversies over “national champions” in Europe raise the question of where
exactly is “home” for a modern corporation. This survey of Europe’s 100 largest listed
companies shows that their home market is increasingly Europe as a whole rather than
any particular country within it.   The share of European sales in their total revenue is
almost identical, on average, to the share of US revenue for the US Top 100, at 65%. The
share of their national (or, for smaller countries, regional) base is on a rapidly declining
trend and stands at 36.9% of global revenue in 2005 against 50.2% in 1997.  The geogra-
phical distribution of employees within the same companies appears to follow a similar
pattern. In this group, German companies are among the frontrunners of both europeani-
sation and globalisation. Italian and, to a lesser extent, Spanish companies remain stron-
gly biased towards their home market, though less than in the past. French companies
have europeanised rather than globalised, while for UK-based companies, both trends
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The trend towards europeanisation of
Europe’s largest companies calls into
question policies that are based on
corporate nationality. It undermines
the effectiveness of policies aimed
at national economic performance
through the support of “national
champions” – when this support
takes place at group rather than plant
level. Moreover, it lowers the obsta-
cles to the mobility of corporate
headquarters within the European
space. This could set the stage for
more regulatory competition in the
future in areas which include securi-
ties law, taxation and corporate
governance. European policymakers
need to adapt to this new landscape. 
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1In this respect, there
is scope for concern
in the recently propo-
sed replacement of
the current rule on
“segment reporting”
(IAS 14) by a new
standard (coded
ED8) which is based
on an existing US
accounting rule,
which might lead to
information of a les-
ser quality in this
respect. It is to be
hoped that the legiti-
mate desire for
convergence bet-
ween IFRS and US
accounting rules
does not lead to les-
ser quality informa-
tion, as can be fea-
red in this particular
case.
WHAT alignment exists between the
respective interests of companies
and countries? The rhetoric of
“national champions” is pervasive
and has recently been given new
prominence. However, the notion of
“corporate nationality” is ambi-
guous. A company’s culture, internal
working language, and management
may be strongly influenced by the
place where it was initially created.
But this link exists only to a certain
degree which generally tends to
decrease with time as the company
gradually “internationalises”, whe-
ther through internal growth or
cross-border acquisitions, and as its
behaviour is correspondingly
influenced. 
Internationalisation can primarily be
measured with reference to any one
of the three key markets a company
taps into: clients, labour, and capital.
This survey focuses on the first two,
by looking at the geographical reve-
nue distribution of Europe’s 100 lar-
gest listed companies (“Europe Top
100” ranked by market capitalisa-
tion, see box), and the link between
the location of revenue and of
employees. A comparison is made
with the 100 largest listed compa-
nies in the United States (“US Top
100”) to assess the distinctiveness,
or lack thereof, of Europe’s large cor-
porations. This forms part of an
ongoing effort undertaken by
Bruegel to analyse the interplay bet-
ween globalisation and Europe’s eco-
nomic integration. 
1. THE CHAMPIONS’ LEAGUE
Even though they cannot be conside-
red representative of the whole eco-
nomy, the largest companies weigh
heavily: a sketchy order of magnitude
is given by the Europe Top 100 compa-
nies’ cumulative revenue, which
amounts to 34% of Europe’s GDP –
admittedly an inflated indication
since it covers global operations, and
value added only represent a fraction
of sales. The estimated cumulative
headcount of the same 100 compa-
nies in Europe alone amounts to
nearly 5% of the continent’s total busi-
ness labour force. The average reve-
nue of the Europe Top 100 companies
is €39bn (and the median revenue is
€29bn), while the largest European
Sources and methodology
The use of market capitalisation for the ranking is justified by the fact that it is the simplest available measure of the financial might of companies, and additionally has
the advantage of allowing comparisons between all industries. The sampling is based on the “Global 1200” review in BusinessWeek, 26 December 2005, with a few upda-
tes. Two recently listed companies, EDF and Google, were included; three companies which were since purchased by others, O2, MBNA and Burlington Resources, were
removed. Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton were considered Australian and therefore not included in the European sample. Companies have been reordered by market capitalisa-
tion by 26 June 2006, as retrieved from Google Finance and other public websites. The exchange rate used to convert US market capitalisations into euros is 1.2582 euro
per dollar. Each European company was assigned a “Headquarters Zone” depending on the location of its operational headquarters. For this, Europe was divided into 9
zones (Figure 1), which, in order to diminish the bias linked to the size of “home” territory, have been carved out so that all zones’ GDPs are roughly of the same order of
magnitude. An exception was made for Switzerland, treated as a zone of its own in view of its position outside the EU and of the significant number of leading companies
headquartered there (by contrast, no company in the sample is located in the large Central and South Eastern Zone). The inclusion of non-EU European countries derives
from the fact that corporate data generally use splits based on geography rather than EU membership. Judgment had to be exercised for companies with multiple head-
quarters such as Unilever, Royal Dutch Shell, EADS, or Reed Elsevier. The revenue distribution is based on audited consolidated financial statements and notes as publi-
shed in annual reports and regulatory filings for the financial years 1997 and 2005. 2004 data had to be used for a limited number of companies which had not yet publi-
shed their 2005 report; similarly, 1998 or 1999 data were used in some cases where 1997 data could not be retrieved. The adoption of international financial reporting
standards (IFRS) in 2005 has markedly
increased the quality of revenue reporting
by geographical segments and, crucially,
has made it much easier to include finan-
cial-services firms in the same framework
of analysis as non-financial ones
1.
However, even in 2005 the corresponding
data are not fully standardised, and some
companies provide better quality informa-
tion than others. When segment revenue
was not available, the analysis was gene-
rally based on the part of total sales for
which a geographical breakdown could be
documented, which in some cases such as
Dexia is less than half total revenue. No
comparable analysis could be made for US
companies which generally provide no
information on the distribution of their US
revenue within US territory. Finally, when
averages are calculated they are non-
weighted ones, as the aim of this survey is
to analyse the typical company profile
rather than aggregated trends.  The metho-
dology and data used for this study will be
further detailed in a forthcoming Bruegel
working paper. 
company by this measure, Royal
Dutch Shell, has a revenue of €238bn. 
Figure 2 shows the details of these
companies and of the counterpart
sample of US Top 100, with both sam-
ples sorted by market capitalisation. It
is to be noted that the US Top 100
companies are generally smaller than
the Europe Top 100 when measured
by revenue at the current exchange
rate (average €32bn and median
€20bn), but are valued by the market
at a higher multiple of sales with an
average market capitalisation of
€60bn, versus €45bn in the European
sample. 
For each European company, Figure 2
provides the respective shares of the
"Home Base" where headquarters are
located (see box), of the rest of Europe
and of the rest of the world in total
revenue. It also shows the comparable
data for the US Top 100 companies
(without intra-US split), and adds an
indication of market capitalisation
(black curves on both graphs). These
company-specific data form the basis
for the aggregate analysis which is
developed in the next charts. 
Nordic (9 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population: 31,7m
(5,3% of Eur.)GDP: €942b (8,0% of Eur.)
UK & Ireland(26 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population:
64,5m (10,8% of Eur.) GDP: €1929b (16,4% of Eur.)
Benelux (11 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population: 27,3m
(4,8% of Eur.) GDP: €825b (7,0% of Eur.)
Germany(14 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population: 82,5m
(13,8% of Eur.) GDP: €2241b (19,1% of Eur.)
Switzerland (9 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population: 7,5m
(1,25% of Eur.) GDP: €295b (2,5% of Eur.)
France (18 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population: 60,9m
(10% of Eur.) GDP: €1680rn (14,4% of Eur.)
Spain & Portugal (6 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population:
54,4m (9,1% of Eur.) GDP: €1052b (8,9% of Eur.)
Italy (7 companies in Eur. Top 100) Population: 58,7m (9,8%
of Eur.) GDP: €1417b (12,1% of Eur.)
Central & South Eastern (0 companies in Eur. Top 100)
Population: 209m (35% of Eur.) GDP: €1356trn (11,5% of Eur.)
Fig. 1



















Source: Bruegel estimates based on company disclosures; see box on sources and methodology
Top 100 US Companies
Fig. 2































































































































Top 100 European Companies























































































































Source for Figs  3, 4: Bruegel estimates based on company disclosures
Fig. 4












Europe and US Top 100: average revenue structure by industry sector
The sector-based analysis on Figure
3 shows that the “home bias” (share
of the HQ Zone in total revenue) and
“European bias” (share of Europe in
total revenue) are lowest for tradable
goods such as pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, consumer products,
industrial goods and technology. By
contrast, heavily regulated indus-
tries such as banking and telecoms
still remain predominantly national.
The comparison with US companies
in the same industries shows that
the overseas dimension (i.e., non-
European revenue for European com-
panies, and non-US revenue for US
ones) is generally at a comparable
level in Europe and in the US, except
in insurance and utilities where US
companies have significantly less
overseas activities on average than
their European counterparts. 
There is also a strong link between a
company’s home bias and the loca-
tion of its headquarters, as shown by
Figure 4. Unlike what might have
been expected, the home bias is only
weakly correlated to the size of the HQ
Zone, except for Switzerland which is
markedly smaller than all other
zones. In particular, Germany’s lar-
gest companies are remarkably inter-
nationalised in spite of being located
in the largest of our European zones in
GDP terms. There is no significant dif-
ference between the UK/Ireland zone
and France as regards the home bias;
however, as reflected by the same
chart, UK and Irish companies have a
privileged orientation towards the US
(on average, 22% of their sales vs.
16% for the Europe Top 100). By the
same token,  Spanish companies lean
towards Latin America (29% of their
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cantly grown in size, with an average
growth of revenue of 50% for the 55
European companies. This trend
includes both components of exter-
nal and internal growth, of which it
has not been attempted here to iden-
tify the respective effects. It also
incorporates the effects of different
patterns of outsourcing and/or offs-
horing which, even within the same




Compared Distributions of Revenues and Employees
Sample of 73 companies among Europe Top 100
Nordic (4)





Spain and Portugal (5)
Italy (4)
Eur. Average (73)
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2. EUROPEANISATION
TRUMPS  GLOBALISATION
To assess the trends of internationa-
lisation in recent history, data for a
little more than half (55) of the com-
panies in each sample, European
and US, were analysed for the finan-
cial year 1997 and compared to
2005. Within a relatively short time
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sales vs. 6% for the Europe Top 100).
Italian companies, and to a lesser
extent Spanish ones, still have a stri-
kingly high home bias.
A question of significant economic
and political relevance is whether
there is a correlation between the
location of customers (the geographi-
cal revenue split) and that of
employees. At individual company
level, discrepancies between the two
can be significant. For example, Nokia
has 49% of its workforce but less than
5% of sales in the Nordic zone; Roche
has almost 12% of its workforce but
less than 1% of its sales in
Switzerland. However, on average the
difference is much less marked.
Figure 5 shows the corresponding
comparison for those companies for
which the breakdown of employees
by regional zones is sufficiently docu-
mented, namely 73 European compa-
nies. 
Those differences that remain on ave-
rage between the “sales” and “staff”
splits can be explained by various fac-
tors: for example, Nordic, German and
Swiss companies tend to be strong
exporters, and Spanish companies
have large numbers of employees in
Latin America. But on the whole, sales
and staff are distributed along































Source for Figs  5,6: Bruegel estimates based on company disclosures
Fig. 6
Revenue distribution: Europe and US, 1997 and 2005 
























Strikingly, the overseas dimension
has increased in almost exactly
parallel ways for European and US
companies in the past eight years
(Figure 6 on previous page). They
start from a comparable level in
1997 (28.4% and 29.3% respecti-
vely) to reach 35% and 34.8% res-
pectively in 2005. This increase
appears measured when compared
to the high growth rate of some over-
seas markets (as in Asia) and to the
prominence of globalisation in cor-
porate strategy and collective repre-
sentations over the past few years. A
recent study of US firms by Goldman
Sachs Economic Research com-
ments that “the impact of globaliza-
tion in the corporate data is so limi-
ted that it reminds [one] of the late-
1990s joke (or what passes for one
in economic circles) about the
impact of technology on producti-
vity—you see it everywhere but in
the productivity statistics.”
3
For European companies, the share
of the HQ Zone in total activity has
sharply declined, from 50.2% of glo-
bal sales in 1997 to less than 37% in
2005. For these companies, euro-
peanisation trumps globalisation in
the sense that expansion out of their
home base takes place comparati-
Fig. 7
Changes in Revenue Structure by Industry Sector, Europe and US, 1997 and 2005
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US Rest of World
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Source: Bruegel estimates based on company disclosures
vely faster in Europe than overseas.
This can be attributed only in part to
expansion in Central and Eastern
Europe, which represents 28% of the
average increase in the “rest of
Europe” sales.  Actually, expansion in
Western Europe out of the home
base also takes place at a more rapid







may have played a




sation and globalisation varies
somewhat with the location of a
company’s headquarters (also on
Figure 6). The average home bias
has most decreased for companies
headquartered in the UK, Italy,
Germany and France, by 25, 21, 16.5
and 11.5 percentage points respecti-
vely. For companies in France and
Italy, this has been mainly due to
europeanisation, while the propor-
tion of overseas revenue has remai-
ned stable. In Germany and the UK,
europeanisation and globalisation
have occurred simultaneously.
Further analysis shows that the US
has been the area of fastest expan-
sion overseas for both UK and
German companies.
The evolution sector by sector
(Figure 7) highlights the significant
impact of market ope-
ning policies in Europe,
especially in the areas
of telecoms and utilities
(but only to a limited
extent in banking). It
also hints at significant
changes in the structure
of the markets for
consumer goods, retail
and logistics in Europe,
which could perhaps be
linked to the EU’s single market poli-
cies. 
Employee data were not sufficiently
documented for 1997 to allow a
meaningful analysis of the geogra-
phical split of headcounts for that
year. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the link between reve-
nue split and headcount split was
comparable in 1997 with what it was
in 2005 as presented in Figure 5
above. 
“The average home
bias has most decrea-
sed for companies
headquartered in the





















3. A EUROPEAN BUSINESS
IDENTITY? 
If current trends are extrapolated,
more than half of large companies’
average activity within Europe will be
done outside of their home base as
early as 2009. However, caution is
required before concluding that
these companies are becoming
European more than they are natio-
nal. As previously mentioned, all
depends on how one tries to define
corporate nationality. 
Some argue that, in the coming age
of global interdependence, this
notion is becoming irrelevant, a
point of view which was forcefully
expressed recently by IBM’s
Chairman and CEO, Samuel J.
Palmisano
4. Others tend to think that
in spite of cross-border expansion,
the national character of companies
will always remain an essential fact
of life
5. Others still think that the
trend towards “post-national” com-
panies is real but should be counte-
red by a reassertion of national sove-
reignty
6. 
At this point, our data suggest that
large companies both keep a strong
national bias and grow to be more
global, but that simultaneously their
European identity is becoming just
too significant to be ignored. In
terms of location of their activities,
Europe’s large companies are as
European as US ones are American,
and within Europe the share of their
national or regional home base will
soon on average be exceeded by the
share of other countries. In other
words, by this measure the equiva-
lent of US large companies’
4. ADAPTING POLICIES TO A
NEW REALITY 
Policymakers are no less challenged
by the europeanisation of large com-
panies than are corporate managers.
The perception of a convergence of
interests between “national” compa-
nies and their respective nations is
deeply ingrained in many senior poli-
cymakers’ world view. French Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin has
encapsulated this perception in his
advocacy of a new patrio-
tisme économique. The
same attitude is present
all around Europe, even
when less colorfully
expressed, as illustrated
by recent stories about
Spain’s Endesa, Italia’s
Autostrade, Poland’s PKO
BP, or the UK’s Centrica
and London Stock
Exchange (not to mention
Unocal or P&O operations
in the US), even though the specific
nature of the issue varies greatly
from one case to another. 
A first policy implication of europea-









deration. Any form of
support or protection
that fosters the com-
petitive position of a




site) is likely to primarily benefit the
company’s customers in the form of
lower prices, and secondarily its
employees (higher salaries) and/or
its shareholders (higher profits).
Thus, the decreasing average share
of both customers and employees in
the “home” area for large companies
across Europe means that national
support or protection is increasingly
bound to end up enriching their
“foreign” stakeholders rather than
the national economy. 
The logical consequence would be for
governments to focus their efforts on
competitiveness policies at local or
employee level without any conside-
ration of “corporate nationality”, as
was advocated by Robert Reich in a
seminal article published 16 years
ago
7. By contrast, schemes where
support is granted at group level,
such as France’s recently establi-
shed Agency for
Industrial Innovation
(AII) and more gene-
rally national support






singly be criticised for
their use of taxpayers’
money effectively
resulting in a transfer of wealth to
foreign stakeholders. The only rele-
“Some argue that, in
the coming age of
global interdepen-




“The  logical conse-
quence would be for
governments to














ble ?, Editions Odile
Jacob, 2004. 
6See for example
Barry Lynn, End of
the Line: The Rising









“American” identity is the European
identity, not the national one, and
increasingly so. 
Whether the europeanisa-
tion of Europe’s large com-
panies results from
conscious strategies may
be disputed. What anecdo-
tal evidence suggests is
that many companies in
Europe still have to adapt
their internal structures,
processes and references
to their activities’ shifting
geographic pattern. To
take a simple indicator, the
nationalities within execu-
tive committees generally
by no means reflect the
diversity of companies’ customers
and employees. Given the trends
highlighted in this survey, it is likely
that some features of national busi-
ness identities all around Europe will
be increasingly called into question.
Whether a distinctive European busi-
ness identity will emerge, however,
remains an open issue. 
“Many  companies
in Europe still have
to adapt their inter-
nal structures, pro-
cesses and referen-
ces  to the shifting
geographical pat-
tern of their activi-
ties”. vant level for such R&D policies
applied to large companies would be
the European one.
Moreover, the trends described in
this survey could have indirect
consequences on many other poli-
cies that apply at corporate (or
group) level by calling into question
their national framing within Europe.
One paramount example is
Mitbestimmung, the codetermina-
tion requirement applicable to large
companies incorporated in Germany.
It gives workers’ representatives a
special role in governance bodies –
but these are the representatives of
German, not European or worldwide,
workers. The inherent tension bet-
ween this provision and the realities
of internationalisation was graphi-
cally illustrated when tyre maker
Continental announced layoffs at its
Hanover plant in November 2005. As
Continental’s German works council
protested, CEO Manfred Wennemer
justified the restructuring by stating:
“my duty is to my 80,000 workers
worldwide” – i.e., not only to the
German ones
8.
The europeanisation of large compa-
nies poses a specific challenge to
regulations applicable at corporate
level such as Mitbestimmung,
because it may contribute to
enabling an increased future mobi-
lity of head offices within the
European space. When a company
has two-thirds or more of its
European activity in one country,
there can be many practical, legal
and political obstacles to shifting its
headquarters across the border. By
contrast, these obstacles tend to
diminish as the home country repre-
sents less of the total European or
global activity. Cross-border mergers
have already led to several reloca-
tions of registered offices in Europe,
such as EADS’s incorporation in the
Netherlands in 2000. Furthermore,
HQ moves can also be disconnected
from mergers, as Boeing did in the US
by moving its head office from
Seattle to Chicago in 2001. The pros-
pect for headquarters mobility is fur-
ther enhanced by recent case law of
the European Court of Justice
9 and





























fies the possibility to
shift headquarters
from one European
country to another in










the EU even when
the country of incor-
poration is not the
one in which the
company has its
operational activity.




envisaged as part of
the action plan on
corporate gover-
nance and company,
and on which the
European
Commission carried
out a public consul-
tation in the spring
of 2004.
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The possible prospect of more head-
quarters mobility inside Europe,
including for large companies, may
lead to an increased occurrence of
regulatory competition, i.e. competi-
tion between different national regu-
latory frameworks in key areas such
as securities law and regulation, cor-
porate law, some tax issues, or cor-
porate-level labour regulations such
as Mitbestimmung. The debate whe-
ther regulatory competition leads to
a “race to the bottom” or “to the top”
in terms of regulatory requirements
is a complex and often heated one in
the US, as in the example of corpo-
rate law, which has remained in the
almost exclusive remit of the States,
with no federal legislation until the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. If the
future confirms the scenario of
increased cross-border mobility of
headquarters of large companies
made possible by their rapid euro-
peanisation, then regulatory compe-
tition is likely to gain increasing pro-
minence in Europe, with wide-ran-
ging consequences on the nature
and content of regulatory processes
and legislation. 
The author thanks Manuela Naessl
for her outstanding work as research
assistant for the preparation of this
policy brief.
“Regulatory competi-
tion is likely to gain
increasing promi-
nence in Europe.”